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Abstract 
Economic and policy literature on the vertical separation of incumbent telecommunications 
providers indicates that costs and risks of separation are high, and benefits hard to identify. 
Thus, providers should only be vertically separated when there is a proven risk of 
discrimination, all other feasible regulatory avenues to control the risk have been eliminated, 
and a cost-benefit analysis indicates a favourable outcome for separation.  
Contrary to this view, the New Zealand Government mandated the separation of Telecom 
New Zealand without either detailed empirical analysis or active debate of the issues. 
Examination of the case reveals that political (rather than economic) factors best explain both 
the motivation to separate Telecom and the manner in which the separation was imposed.  
Pursuit of competition has replaced pursuit of increased efficiency as the objective of sector 
policy, leading to direct political control of sector regulation. New Zealand’s separation 
policy process is therefore unsuitable as a model for economic-principled policy-making in 
other jurisdictions.  
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Introduction 
Vertical separation of competitive network services from the (presumed non-competitive) 
local loop network of an incumbent operator is a costly, risky and radical step that 
fundamentally changes the structure of the industry in which that firm participates. Whether 
adopted voluntarily or by legislative or regulatory mandate, there is a general agreement 
amongst academics, policy-makers and industry participants that it should not be undertaken 
lightly.  
On the one hand, separation appears to offer the promise of a “level competitive playing 
field” whereby the incumbent’s ability to discriminate in favour of its own wholesale and 
retail operations is severely constrained (Cave, 2006). However, on the other hand its 
substantiated costs are large in magnitude and wide-ranging in effect (Xavier & Ypsilanti, 
2004), and the anticipated benefits are at best highly uncertain and difficult to quantify 
(Crandall & Sidak, 2002; Cave, 2002; OECD, 2003; Crandall, 2005). Moreover, once 
imposed, separation is generally considered irreversible (Xavier & Ypsilanti, 2004). 
Consequently, caution has been advised when considering its imposition (e.g. OECD, 2003). 
A broad consensus of policy frameworks for evaluating separation has emerged. This includes 
both the elimination from feasible consideration of all other possible regulatory options and 
the presence of a cost-benefit analysis that clearly demonstrates a net positive benefit before 
any mandatory separation is required by legislators and regulators (e.g. Xavier & Ypsilanti, 
2004; de Bijl, 2005). 
In this context, structural and behavioural choices for separation—surrounding both the form 
of separation undertaken (on a continuum between full ownership separation at one end and 
simple accounting separation at the other (Cave, 2006)) and the manner in which it is imposed 
(voluntary versus mandatory)—are strictly secondary to the determination of whether it offers 
the most cost-effective way of remedying the perceived market imperfections. Clarity about 
exactly what these imperfections are, and compelling evidence that in the long run, the 
proposed remedy is the most efficient available amongst a range of possible alternatives, are 
necessary. The mere existence of a bottleneck or risk of discriminatory activity are 
insufficient to justify separation, given the high costs and uncertainties associated, especially 
in respect of incentives (both incumbent and entrant) to invest in future networks that will 
bypass the bottleneck (de Bijl, 2005).   
It might be expected, therefore, that mandatory legislated separation in those jurisdictions in 
which it has been imposed has been accompanied by rigorous theoretical and empirical 
economic analysis of the nature proposed above. A test of the adequacy of the policy-making 
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process via which separation is imposed should therefore look for unequivocal evidence of 
both the existence of a material discrimination risk, detailed empirical assessment of the 
efficacy of the proposed separation arrangements and their superiority over other possible 
remedies, with specific reference to the manner of their imposition and the likely effects on 
future network investment.  
This paper examines the policy-making processes via which separation has been imposed on 
New Zealand incumbent network operator Telecom. Section one provides a brief history of 
New Zealand telecommunications regulatory environment from 1987. This analysis sets the 
long-run industry and policy context in which the decision was made in 2006 to separate 
Telecom into network, wholesale and retail operations. Sections two and three respectively 
document the processes over the period 2005-2008 via which separation was firstly proposed 
and legislated, and then subsequently imposed. Section four discusses the adequacy of the 
New Zealand process, benchmarked against the aforementioned expectations of policy 
process adequacy.  
Contrary to theoretical expectations, the New Zealand example has been characterised by an 
absence of principled economic consideration, and overt politicisation of the processes via 
which separation has been imposed. It would appear that political, rather than economic 
factors best explain both the motivation to separate Telecom and the manner of the policy’s 
imposition. The pursuit of increased competition, in order to be seen to deliver upon a 
populist electoral commitment, appears to have prevailed over the historic economic 
efficiency considerations and arms-length discharging of the regulatory function that 
prevailed in the period leading up to separation. Consequently, Telecom’s separation has 
proceeded despite the substantial transaction and investment opportunity costs incurred and 
without any evidence of the benefits accruing being sufficiently larger than those evidenced in 
other jurisdictions in order to compensate for the New Zealand market’s substantial scale 
disadvantages.  
The New Zealand separation policy development process is therefore unsuitable as a model 
for principled policy-making in other jurisdictions.  
1. Efficiency and the Separation Debate in New Zealand: 1987-2005 
Debate about vertical separation of the incumbent New Zealand telecommunications provider 
Telecom New Zealand originated from decisions taken in the 1980s to separate 
telecommunications from the banking and postal services operated for over one hundred years 
by the Government-owned Post Office and privatise the resulting entity (Howell & Sangekar, 
2009). When Telecom was incorporated in 1989, separation of the local access network from 
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long distance services, similar to that undertaken contemporaneously in the United States 
(Crandall, 2005) was considered, but was ultimately rejected in favour of a single integrated 
firm. In part, the decision was influenced by financial advice that a higher price might be 
expected upon privatisation for an integrated firm (Wilson, 1994), reflecting a contemporary 
market view that in New Zealand vertical integration offered scale and scope economies.   
1.1 ‘Light-Handed’ Regulation 
At the same time, the Government rejected industry-specific regulation of former 
Government-owned infrastructure businesses in favour of generic competition law, albeit with 
additional disclosure and contractual obligations and the threat of future ministerial price 
control being imposed on formerly Government-owned businesses holding a dominant market 
position (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996). These arrangements have come to be known as New 
Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ approach to the regulation of dominant firms (Evans, Grimes, 
Wilkinson & Teece, 2006).  
Pivotal factors in the decision to adopt a ‘light-handed’ regulatory approach were New 
Zealand’s small size, geographical isolation, low population density, high concentration levels 
in most significant industries and the very substantial overheads of maintaining industry-
specific regulation (Howell, 2007).  New Zealand has a population of only just over 4.3 
million people with only 471,000 significant businesses and 1.6 million households.1 The 
three-firm concentration ratios in almost every significant industry (even those without 
significant scale effects) exceed 90% (Arnold, Boles de Boer & Evans, 2002).  
The historic decisions to privatise and ‘lightly regulate’ a vertically-integrated Telecom and 
several other formerly state-owned businesses have engendered long-standing divides in the 
New Zealand political landscape between the politicians who oversaw the initial decisions 
(the Labour Government of 1984-1990) and perpetuated the policies (the National and 
National-led Governments of 1990-1999) and opponents favouring greater Government 
involvement in the economy and wishing to differentiate themselves from decisions that were 
highly contentious due to allegations that they were undertaken without a popular political 
mandate (predominantly the Labour Party leadership dating from the early 1990s) (Bassett, 
2008).  
Following extensive litigation between Clear Corporation and Telecom from 1991 to 1994 
over Telecom’s alleged exertion of its dominant position (Telecom was ultimately found by 
the Privy Council not to have acted anti-competitively), structural separation (along with 
other possible changes to the regulatory regime) was later revisited by a joint Treasury and 
                                                     
1 Data from Statistics New Zealand, 2008. www.stats.govt.nz 
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Ministry of Commerce (1995) investigation. Consistent with the theoretical recommendations 
for robust separation policy analysis, efficiency-based criteria (including the costs and risks of 
regulatory as well as market failure) were utilised to develop a cost-benefit analysis of the 
prevailing arrangements and a number of alternatives, including various degrees of vertical 
and ownership separation. The review found no conclusive evidence that the existing 
structural and regulatory arrangements had “failed” in respect to the objective of maximising 
the contribution of the telecommunications sector to the overall growth of the economy 
through the promotion of economic efficiency (Howell, 2007).  
1.2 Industry-Specific Regulation  
However, persistent dissatisfaction amongst Telecom’s competitors and political opponents of 
‘light-handed’ regulation culminated in 2000 (following the election of a Labour-led coalition 
Government in 1999) in another sector review (MED, 2000). Industry-specific regulation 
overseen by the Telecommunications Commissioner was introduced via the 
Telecommunications Act 2001. Nonetheless, the pursuit of economic efficiency as a 
prevailing sector objective was reinforced in Section 18(2), which required the Commissioner 
to take account “in determining whether or not, or the extent to which, any act or omission 
will result, or will be likely to result, in competition in telecommunications markets for the 
long-term benefit of end-users of telecommunications services within New Zealand, the 
efficiencies that will result, or will be likely to result, from that act or omission”.  
Consistent with the Act, subsequent Commission recommendations were underpinned by 
cost-benefit analyses undertaken using efficiency-based decision criteria (Howell, 2008). 
Notably, in 2003, using total welfare as the decision metric (Hausman & Sidak, 2005), full 
local loop unbundling was rejected in favour of limited bitstream unbundling as “the overall 
benefits from unbundling are not sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the Commission that a 
regulated solution is warranted” (Commerce Commission, 2003, p.v). Furthermore, twice 
(2005 and 2006) the Commission recommended regulation of mobile termination rates, on the 
basis of increased consumer welfare (Howell, 2007).  
However, as the Telecommunications Act 2001 empowers the Commissioner only to make 
recommendations, which must subsequently be either approved or rejected by the Minister 
(with appropriate legislative changes made), there is no binding obligation on politicians to 
legislate consistent with the efficiency objective. Whilst the Minister accepted the local loop 
recommendation (a decision very unpopular with Telecom’s competitors, despite the 
additional imposition of broadband account and market share targets), both mobile 
termination recommendations were rejected in favour of a Ministerially-brokered contractual 
agreement (Howell, 2007).  
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 2. The 2005-6 ‘Stocktake’ 
Vertical separation of Telecom was not addressed again specifically as a remedy for any 
alleged market or regulatory failures until May 2006, when it was proposed as one of the 
possible options in a review of the industry instigated by the Minister of Communications in 
November 2005. The “stocktake” review in part fulfilled the minority Labour Government’s 
telecommunications policy in the September general election campaign, which included a 
promise to closely monitor and enforce unbundling commitments that Telecom had made, and 
to ensure the Government’s targets for broadband uptake were met. In the year ended 
December 2005, Telecom sold 11% more connections than agreed with the Minister in 2003 
as a consequence of his accepting the Commissioner’s bitstream unbundling proposal. 
However, only 24.5% (rather than 33%) were retailed by Telecom’s competitors (Commerce 
Commission, 2006).  
The stocktake was led by officials from the Ministry of Economic Development (MED), 
rather than the Telecommunications Commission. Increased economic efficiency was 
replaced as the principal objective by “advancing policies to ensure that the 
telecommunications sector becomes more competitive and that we achieve faster broadband 
uptake in line with our competitors” (MED, 2006, para. 2). The report was tabled in Cabinet 
in May 2006. The primary recommendation was mandatory full local loop unbundling.  
Separation was proposed as a subsidiary recommendation to be invoked only if the desired 
outcomes were not being achieved via the preferred instruments: “that structural separation of 
Telecom into a wholesale and retail business, to remove incentives to impede access to its 
network for competitors, be kept under review in case there are on-going difficulties with 
implementation of the Government’s broadband objectives” (MED, 2006, para. 10).  
2.1 Inadequate Empirical Analysis 
Scant literature reviews and no empirical cost benefit analyses were undertaken during the 
stocktake, even though the Commissioner’s extensive 2003 local loop unbundling (LLU) 
analysis found only a very small net benefit and very substantial risks, especially in respect of 
future investment incentives and stranded competitors’ assets in light of Telecom’s proposed 
Next Generation Network (NGN) investments. Instead, regulatory costs were presumed to be 
lower in 2006 than when the Commissioner undertook his analysis, thereby increasing the 
desirability of the proposed regulations (MED, 2006a, pp..52-53). On the basis of OECD 
officials’ assertions, the stocktake authors did “not consider that there are any disincentives 
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present for core network infrastructure investment under the proposed packages” (MED, 
2006a, p.54).  
The fiscal risk associated with the proposed changes was assessed as neutral because the 
increased regulatory costs would be passed on to the industry participants (MED, 2006a, 
p.50), and that whilst production costs would increase in respect of regulatory operational and 
information burden, it was presumed most would be borne by Telecom and “the increased 
costs for Telecom are considered to be minimal compared to their total turnover, and to be 
significantly offset by the benefits to consumers and other market players” (MED, 2006, para. 
154).  Whilst Telecom would have less control over its network infrastructure and would face 
increased competitive pressures, the negative effects upon the firm’s profitability, return on 
investment and share price were couched as only possible, not certain, outcomes (MED, 
2006a, p.52). In the two months following the tabling of the stocktake report, Telecom’s share 
price fell from $5.60 to $4.00 (ordinary share value on the New Zealand Stock Exchange), 
representing approximately $4 billion lost shareholder wealth,, approximately $1 billion of 
which was incurred by New Zealand.  
Benefits were deemed to be primarily manifested in reduced costs to access seekers (MED, 
2006a, p.51) (although access-seekers were already buying Telecom services (including 
bitstream access) at regulated cost-based prices and increased competition increasing the 
uptake of broadband services, although “consumers might expect to benefit through” 
unquantified price reductions, expanded services and product innovation (MED, 2006a, p.53).  
To the extent that any possible future separation of Telecom might affect the cost-benefit 
trade-off, benefits cited were the elimination, discrimination, and cross-subsidisation, and a 
reduction in regulatory overhead (MED, 2006, para. 72-73), whilst (unquantified) costs 
included one-off adjustment costs, loss of (unidentified) scale and scope economies, delays in 
broadband development and the time taken to enforce the remedy relative to other 
interventions including full unbundling (MED, 2006, para. 73). Increased prices were seen as 
a likely consequence of separation, especially if it was imposed compulsorily (ibid). The 
question of whether Telecom actually had or might engage in either discriminatory behaviour 
towards competitors or cross-subsidisation amongst its horizontally and vertically integrated 
activities was not raised in either the stocktake report or supporting documentation. Over 
twenty years, Telecom has been twice prosecuted under the Commerce Act for alleged anti-
competitive behaviour and was found not guilty on each occasion (Howell, 2008). Cave 
(2006) likewise notes that despite many allegations of anti-competitive behaviour being made 
against BT prior to its separation, “not one of which led to a formal finding adverse to BT” (p 
99).  
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Separation thus appears to have been considered in the stocktake as simply one of the array of 
regulatory tools available to increase both competition (via the elimination of a potential anti-
competitive action) and New Zealand’s broadband uptake (despite the identified apparent 
contradictory effect upon broadband market development).  
2.2 From Commercial Offer to Policy Imperative 
A Bill implementing unbundling and potential separation was sent to the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee on 29 June 2006.  
Contemporaneously, Telecom announced its intention to undertake a voluntary separation of 
its wholesale and retail fixed line activities, and offered to enter into some form of legally 
binding agreement with the Government. The Government indicated at the time that if a 
robust operational and accounting separation model could be achieved, then full structural 
separation might not be legislatively necessary.  
However, on 28 November 2006, the Select Committee reported back to the House 
recommending that the legislation be amended to provide for future mandatory full three-way 
separation of Telecom according to a process activated by the Minister at some unspecified 
future date. The statutory changes to the Telecommunications Act were passed into law on 
December 18, 2006.  The purpose statement relating to Part 2A covering separation notes it is 
intended to promote competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of 
end-users of telecommunications in New Zealand; require transparency, non-discrimination 
and equivalence of supply; and facilitate efficient investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure and services.  
3. Mandatory Separation: 2007-8 
The Minister of Communications announced on April 5 2007 his intention to proceed directly 
with mandatory separation of Telecom, as per the revised Act. Mandatory separation was 
therefore activated some eleven months before March 13, 2008, when the first unbundled 
Telecom loops were sold. In practice, development of the separation framework proceeded in 
parallel with development of the infrastructural and institutional arrangements for local loop 
unbundling. ‘Separation Day’—when Telecom was officially separated into stand alone 
network (re-branded Chorus), wholesale (Telecom Wholesale) and retail (Telecom Retail) 
arms - was March 31 2008, just over two weeks after the first unbundled local loop was sold.  
3.1 A Fait Accompli 
The separation discussion documents (MED, 2007; Azimuth, 2007; Network Strategies, 2006; 
2007) establish that a three-way separation would occur exactly as provided in the Act, 
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without the benefit of any debate about the efficacy of the policy.  The ensuing process was to 
provide detailed design of the separated entities, the exact regulatory regime in which they 
would operate, and a plan for transition. Consequently only two pages of the 76-page primary 
discussion document (MED, 2007) address any separation policy considerations. Of these, all 
but one paragraph address the benefits of separation as a tool to pre-empt discriminatory 
behaviour: “These potential positive effects do, however, need to be considered in light of 
potential disadvantages associated with vertical separation, such as loss of vertical integration 
scale and scope economies, and an increase in the transaction costs of dealing between 
internal business units” (para. 55).  
The balance of the documentation addresses mainly detailed governance and technical issues 
(Azimuth, 2007), including the applicability of the BT separation arrangements in the New 
Zealand context (Network Strategies, 2006) and how “equivalence” of the products delivered 
by the separated network entity to its own downstream affiliate and arms-length customers 
could be defined, monitored and enforced (Network Strategies, 2007).  
3.2 Telecom’s Response 
Telecom responded on April 27 (Telecom, 2007) that the proposed model was rigid, 
unworkable and unable to be delivered in the proposed timeframes (para. 32), failed to 
address the need for regulatory certainty (para. 14), was predicated upon a regulatory regime 
in which returns were too low and risks too high to engender sectoral investment (para. 6) and 
that under the arrangements, the firm was prepared to invest only $0.5 billion of the $1.5 
billion required for building the network envisaged in the Government’s Digital Strategy 
(para. 5). The threat to withhold investment was made credible when on May 3 the firm 
returned to shareholders $1.1 billion of the proceeds from the sale of its directories business 
(Telecom, 2007b). Concerns were also expressed at the costs and complexity of implementing 
the proposals, the “unworkable” timetable given the significant requirement for scare 
technical resource to implement both separation and local loop unbundling access 
simultaneously (para. 34) and the risks posed to the achievement of other regulatory priorities 
(para. 35). Telecom estimates placed the one-off cost of separation at $300 million (£110 
million), somewhat more than the cost of separating BT (£70 million - Network Strategies, 
2007).  
In a supplementary submission (Telecom 2007a), purported similarities with the BT model 
were rejected, both in respect of the process via which the progression to separate entities 
would take (para. 11) and the functional consequences (para. 12). Telecom alleged the New 
Zealand arrangements imposed greater prescriptive controls on the Telecom board than 
Ofcom imposed on BT (para. 12.1), created a confusing set of regulatory arrangements 
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requiring accountability to three separate authorities (the Minister, the Commissioner and a 
new Commission-appointed oversight group—para. 12.5), imposed greater regulatory control 
over both appointments to the Telecom board (para. 12.2) and the relationships every 
Telecom unit had with any other business unit (para. 12.4) and sought to maintain regulatory 
control of Telecom no matter how successful competition was in the market (para. 12.3).  
Instead, Telecom proposed an alternative set of arrangements (Telecom, 2007) including both 
ownership separation of the fixed-line network ‘Netco’ (para. 18) and replacement of the 
complex regulatory oversight provisions with a regulatory contract between ‘Netco’ and the 
Government identifying services, prices and investment expectations (para. 21). However, the 
offer was conditional upon significant changes in the regulatory environment, including 
assurances of receiving a fair rate of return on investment (para. 24), and a retreat from the 
recently exhibited “propensity to change what is regulated after investments are made” (para. 
25). Telecom also signalled that it had consulted the industry whilst developing the proposal, 
and as a signal of good faith would begin to implement the wholesale service elements of its 
proposal (para38). On May 1, the Minister asked for public submissions on Telecom’s 
proposals by May 15.  
3.3 Political Direction 
The Minister further announced on May 31, 2007 that he, and not the Telecommunications 
Commissioner, would lead the separation process. The decision reflected “the urgency 
attached by the Government to the need to secure a clear outcome on this matter in the 
shortest possible timeframe. Because this is a major structural issue and not a matter of micro 
regulation, this was felt and is still felt to be the appropriate way forward” (Cunliffe, 2007).  
On July 5, he confirmed that, although there were merits in Telecom’s alternative proposals, 
the Government would “not be revisiting the policy framework of the recently updated 
Telecommunications Act” due to the “need for rapid progress to provide the industry, 
including Telecom, with the certainty they need to move forward with confidence” (Cunliffe, 
2007a)..   
When the final determination was released on September 27, it contained only minor changes 
to the April proposals. Subsequent activity (including detailed development of Telecom’s 
contractual undertakings with the Minister required under the Act), was focused mainly on 
enabling the predetermined structures to be given practical force.  
On October 27, shortly after filing its first draft undertakings to the Minister, Telecom 
announced that it would invest $1.4 billion over 5 years to build a new fibre-based network 
(effectively completing the 2003 investment plans originally scheduled to be complete by 
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2009 had bitstream unbundling not proceeded). Ten days later, the Telecommunications 
Commissioner’s Decision 609 announced final monthly rental prices for unbundled local 
loops 14% (rural) and 20% (urban) higher than those indicated in the July draft determination.   
On March 31 2008, separated network firm Chorus began operations. 
4. The Political Economy of New Zealand Separation 
Benchmarking against the robust separation policy processes recommended by Xavier & 
Ypsilanti (2004) and de Bijl (2005), the New Zealand policy and decision-making processes 
fell well short of demonstrating the level of caution recommended for such a significant 
intervention. No cost-benefit analyses were undertaken, in either the stocktake or separation 
exercises. Indeed, separation was not even one of the primary recommendations of the 
stocktake, which focused principally upon local loop unbundling. Rather, consistent with the 
theoretical literature, it was proposed as a secondary measure to be invoked only if the 
primary measures failed to engender the degree of competition and increases in broadband 
uptake desired.  
4.1 A Costly Endeavour 
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that, consistent with both the literature and practice, the 
costs of separation in New Zealand have been both certain and large, and the benefits 
extremely hard to identify, let alone quantify. Shareholder wealth been destroyed. The 
impasse over how separation would be implemented has led to substantial delays in 
Telecom’s NGN investment plans. Telecom’s cost of capital has increased as debt levels have 
increased to fund new investment that might otherwise have been funded by retained equity 
(Moody’s downgraded Telecom’s credit rating from A2/P-1 to A3/P-2 on February 17, 2009, 
citing the regulatory changes as a significant factor). Telecom has incurred additional fixed 
separation costs in excess of $300 million—1.5 times the $200 million competitors indicated 
in 2006 they were likely to invest if unbundling proceeded. The obligation has caused 
competition internally and externally for scarce resources (including specialist human capital) 
to undertake separation, unbundling and network replacement simultaneously that has 
undoubtedly contributed to pushing out the deadlines for achieving any one of these projects 
alone.  
To put the New Zealand costs in context, the one-off separation cost of $300 million, spread 
across the estimated 1 million broadband accounts projected to be sold by 2010, amounts to 
$300 per account—the equivalent of 10 months basic retail broadband connection at 
prevailing prices. Such a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis thus draws attention to New 
Zealand’s scale diseconomies and how much larger the benefits of separation must be per 
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account or user relative to larger jurisdictions for separation to be economically justifiable (a 
similar exercise on the fixed costs of BT’s separation equates to less than one month’s 
broadband subscription fee per account).  As the stocktake analysis states, although additional 
costs fall initially on Telecom, they will be passed through to access seekers and ultimately to 
consumers if, as presumed in all of the policy documents, Telecom’s fixed line networks 
(both current and future) are genuinely bottleneck assets that will not be subject to 
infrastructure-based competition (bypass) in the foreseeable future, thereby violating the 
objective of regulatory change to reduce costs to consumers.   
Given the magnitude of costs incurred and absence of evidence that discriminatory behaviour 
in New Zealand was a significant factor, it begs the question of why separation has been 
imposed in New Zealand, especially as the effects of the much less intrusive local loop 
unbundling remedy had not yet been demonstrated to be ineffective in addressing either an 
increased efficiency or competitiveness objective. An answer appears to lie in the political 
economy of the telecommunications sector.  
4.2 Competition At Any Cost? 
New Zealand’s past regulatory history had been characterised by ‘light-handed’ interventions 
due to the challenges of small scale and, importantly the time in the investment cycle when 
the regulatory interventions had been considered (e.g. local loop unbundling in 2003, when 
the NGN investment was imminent) (Howell, 2007). Consequently, in 2006, the New Zealand 
telecommunications market did not exhibit artefacts such as the competitor numbers and 
market shares characteristic of regimes where more stringent interventions had been adopted. 
As ‘competition’ is not a good proxy for ‘efficiency’ when scale is important (Alleman & 
Rappoport, 2005), it is far from clear that New Zealand’s ‘insufficiently competitive’ market 
was actually ‘less efficient’ than comparator countries, especially if other restraints (i.e. 
competition law and contractual obligations) were functioning appropriately (Howell, 2008a).  
As long as the prevailing primary regulatory objective remained efficiency-based, the actual 
amount of competitive entry occurring was, rightly, a secondary consideration.  However, 
around 2005, the prevailing political sector objective appears to have changed from the 
pursuit of increased efficiency, whereby competition is but one of the many potential means 
of achieving an efficiency end, to the pursuit of increased competition as an end in itself, 
apparently regardless of the efficiency consequences.  
The policy change is evidenced in the 2005 Labour Party election manifesto, the stocktake 
review objectives, and the statement of regulatory intent in the separation section of the 
Telecommunication Act amendments cited above. It is reinforced by the Commerce 
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Commission’s second mobile termination decision released in April 2006, which interprets 
the efficiency considerations of Section 18(2) of the Act as strictly secondary to the pursuit of 
competition: “where there is a tension between the net public benefits and promotion of 
competition, the statutory context indicates that the primary consideration is the promotion of 
competition …the Telecommunications Act is focused on regulating access to promote 
competition. It does not provide a mechanism that specifically allows for efficiency 
considerations to take precedence over the promotion of competition. Nor is there anything in 
the statutory scheme to suggest that this should be the case” (Commerce Commission, 2006a, 
para. 47-48).  The variance between this decision and the 2003 LLU inquiry suggests that, 
despite the original intention that the Commission operate at arms-length from political 
processes, regulatory decisions were beginning to be influenced by political objectives 
(Howell, 2008a).  
The political origin of the changes is confirmed by the pattern of incremental interventions 
beginning in 1999 that had successively distanced the prevailing Government leadership from 
the ‘light-handed’ policies of its predecessors. Whilst industry-specific regulation under the 
Commission may have initially delivered efficiency-raising (or subsequently at least not 
efficiency-reducing) recommendations, they had minimal effect on competition metrics 
(Howell, 2008a). Having relied upon popular electoral support for its interventionist policies 
in the 2005 election, the Government was obliged to deliver evidence within the three-year 
electoral horizon of its success in increasing competition. Structural changes (unbundling, 
separation) provide more tangible evidence in the short-run of action being taken than relying 
on the more measured approach of regulatory processes. “Competition” metrics are also more 
tractable to a non-technical electorate than the more esoteric and longer-term outcomes of 
pursuing increased efficiency characteristic of regulatory and policy analysis. Far-reaching 
structural changes could be achieved in such a short time only if past processes could be 
bypassed. Thus it became imperative that politicians, rather than the Commissioner, take 
control of industry direction under the new objective to “increase competition”.  
4.3 A Process for Political Ends 
Thus, the absence of efficiency-based analysis in the stocktake can be explained. Efficiency 
was not a relevant decision-making criterion for enactment of predetermined Government 
policy, making detailed empirical analysis such as the Commission was bound to prepare, 
unnecessary. Conducting the stocktake from the Ministry, rather than the Commission, 
effectively bypassed the Commissioner’s statutory obligation to take account of efficiency, 
thereby obviating the possibility of a cost-benefit analysis that was contradictory to the 
predetermined course of action emerging, as either a check on the rationality of the 
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Government’s policy or a justification to stall the progress of changes. The Minister’s 
supervision of the separation process likewise forestalled any potential efficiency 
considerations complicating delivery of improved competition metrics, and was undertaken 
specifically to ensure that separation was achieved quickly via a set of processes that 
bypassed both the rigour and transparency characteristic of Commission activities (e.g. the 
Minister could deal behind closed doors directly with parties in a manner denied to the 
Commissioner, and his decisions were not subject to review and appeal as occurs with 
Commission decisions).  
In this context, the rapid unchecked progression from the initial stocktake recommendation of 
separation from a secondary to primary regulatory tool can also be explained, although the 
failure of Ministry policy analysts as agents of the public interest to fully examine the 
economic consequences must be questioned. As direct agents of political principals, they 
were likely subject to stronger incentives to follow Ministerial directives than to objectively 
critique the policy in the wider public interest (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).  
4.4 Back to the Future 
Separation appears to become a de facto primary policy objective following Telecom’s first 
voluntary offer in June 2007. It is likely that, given the Government’s strong signal that it was 
going to exercise its legislative powers regardless, Telecom strategists had little option but to 
offer some concessions (i.e. voluntary separation) in the hope of being able to take back some 
control of the firm’s strategic direction from the politicians. Thus, Telecom’s offer was 
contingent upon trading off other likely regulatory impositions.  
To those committed to increasing competition, the prospect of being able to implement the 
most invasive regulatory instrument considered (indeed one which had been mooted as far 
back as the creation of Telecom itself) against an incumbent whom many aggrieved 
competitors felt had ‘escaped’ increased regulatory attention on many occasions in the past 
would have been received with alacrity.  As a structural remedy it provided the most visible 
evidence that action had been taken, and in effect (along with local loop unbundling) 
cemented in place the last of the regulatory alternatives considered, but dismissed in favour of 
‘light-handed’ regulation in the 1980s.  
Separation was also willingly endorsed by Telecom’s competitors, who naturally had been 
ardent lobbyists for increased regulatory intervention since the 1990s. In addition to providing 
one further regulatory shackle on Telecom, it offered significant advantages as most were also 
fully vertically integrated firms with both voice and data infrastructure investments and 
downstream retail operations of their own (i.e. mobile, wireless and cable operators). The 
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potential exists for selective inefficient bypass of separated Telecom networks using 
competitors’ own infrastructures in the most lucrative markets (either geographical or market 
segment) even if their costs are higher than Telecom’s (absent separation). Telecom is left 
bearing the costs of separation uncompensated by entrant access revenues in the bypassed 
markets, thereby raising prices to remaining Telecom customers (both retail and wholesale) 
and delaying investments in new networks in the areas where bypass has not occurred.  
Rather than ‘levelling the playing field’, separation thus inefficiently ‘tips’ it in competitors’ 
favour, in a similar manner to the way cost-based access pricing, in the absence of a tax to 
compensate incumbents for lost revenues otherwise compensating the costs of fulfilling 
universal service obligations, also inefficiently ‘tips’ the field in favour of entrants 
(Armstrong, 2001). That competitors were already bypassing Telecom in some markets at the 
time of the “Stocktake” draws to attention the risks highlighted by de Bijl (2005) of 
incorrectly assuming that a bottleneck is enduring, leading to separation that increases 
competition in the short run, but impairs both total welfare and long-term investment 
incentives.  
It is noted that political control of the telecommunications sector is now cemented in place in 
New Zealand for the foreseeable future, and that ultimately the Government is poised to once 
again become a significant owner of telecommunications infrastructure. In part to address the 
missing market that has emerged for investment in broadband in the face of recent 
interventions, both major political parties in the 2008 general election campaign promised 
substantial Government investment in broadband infrastructure.  The winning National Party-
led minority Government committed to invest $1.5 billion in a nationwide fibre-to-the-home 
network—a process begun on March 31 2009 with the release of documents detailing how 
this will occur.  
 
5. Conclusion 
New Zealand’s separation policy development and enactment bears little resemblance to the 
reasoned processes recommended in the literature. The lack of a principled economic process 
for its development is best explained by internal political factors, in particular a competition 
between the proponents and opponents of the ‘light-handed’ regulation. Whilst economic 
factors underpinned the justification for ‘light-handed regulation’, its opponents have 
succeeded in re-implementing most of the controls rejected at the time light-handed 
regulation was established, most recently by changing the explicit efficiency-raising objective 
to one of increasing competition.  Consequently, the New Zealand processes provide a very 
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poor model for jurisdictions seeking to take a principled economic approach to the question of 
vertically separating an incumbent provider.  
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